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ABSTRACT 
Steganography is the art and science of hiding information within information 
so that an observer does not know that communication is taking place. Bad 
actors passing information using steganography are of concern to the national 
security establishment and law enforcement. An attempt was made to 
determine if steganography was being used by criminals to communicate 
information. Web crawling technology was used and images were downloaded 
from Web sites that were considered as likely candidates for containing 
information hidden using steganographic techniques. A detection tool was used 
to analyze these images. The research failed to demonstrate that steganography 
was prevalent on the public Internet. The probable reasons included the growth 
and availability of large number of steganography-producing tools and the 
limited capacity of the detection tools to cope with them. Thus, a redirection 
was introduced in the methodology and the detection focus was shifted from 
the analysis of the ‘product’ of the steganography-producing software; viz. the 
images, to the 'artifacts’ left by the steganography-producing software while it 
is being used to generate steganographic images. This approach was based on 
the concept of ‘Stego-Usage Timeline’. As a proof of concept, a sample set of 
criminal computers was scanned for the remnants of steganography-producing 
software. The results demonstrated that the problem of ‘the detection of the 
usage of steganography’ could be addressed by the approach adopted after the 
research redirection and that certain steganographic software was popular 
among the criminals. Thus, the contribution of the research was in 
demonstrating that the limitations of the tools based on the signature detection 
of steganographically altered images can be overcome by focusing the 
detection effort on detecting the artifacts of the steganography-producing tools. 
Keywords: steganography, signature detection, file artifact detection.  
1. INTRODUCTION TO STEGANOGRAPHY 
The term steganography is derived from the Greek words steganos, which 
means ‘covered’, and graphein, which means ‘to write’ (Singh, 1999). 
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Steganography is the art and science of hiding information. The term 
steganography can also be used to refer to the hidden information itself. 
Steganography facilitates secret, undetected communication and refers to 
hiding information in information (Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas, 2000).   
1.1. Steganographic Techniques 
Steganography can be hidden within numerous types of files, most commonly 
image files. The images in which the secret information is hidden are called 
carrier files or cover images. The resultant files which contain the hidden 
information are referred to as stegoed files. Various techniques of 
steganography include LSB (least significant bit) steganography (Wayner, 
2002), manipulation of the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) function 
(Acharya and Tsai, 2005), and the append technique (Goudy, 2007). The 
algorithms which are used for hiding information in the carrier files use 
different techniques to hide information in different types of files. These 
algorithms act in known and predictable ways. The embedding action of the 
algorithms often leaves image artifacts in the cover images ("Stego Suite," 
2006).  
The artifacts discussed in the first research project are specific only to the 
images. The term ‘file artifact’ is used to refer to the evidence left by the 
steganography-producing software application on the host system that 
generated the stegoed files and is discussed in the second research project. 
Image artifacts are observable anomalies in various characteristics of the image 
which indicate action of steganographic embedding software. Artifacts consist 
of changes to associated information and are not necessarily detectable by 
analyzing only the pixilated composition of the image (Wayner, 2002).  
Embedding applications employ these steganographic algorithms in various 
ways and to varying degrees of effectiveness and stealth (Wayner, 2002). Some 
applications leave signatures, in the images in which they have hidden 
information. Signatures are means of associating the image with a specific 
steganographic application in order to identify which steganographic 
application must be employed for image extraction. Signatures are also 
detectable by steganalytic software. A detected signature almost always 
indicates the presence of steganography ("StegAlyzerSS," 2006). Shorter 
signatures are more likely to be present in non-stegoed images by random 
chance, thereby producing false positives in signature-based detection 
software.  
1.2 Detection 
Various techniques are employed to detect the presence of steganography. 
Many detection applications are written to detect steganography based on the 
knowledge of the steganographic application which embedded the information. 
These are signature-based detection schemes (Jackson, Gunsch, Claypoole, and 
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Lamont, 2003). A signature-based detection scheme uses knowledge of the 
signatures to identify suspect images. A steganographic embedding application 
implements an embedding algorithm. The application may leave a signature, 
however the algorithm may create one or more image artifacts. These artifacts 
can then be detected in the image regardless of the application which employed 
the method that the algorithm is written to implement ("Stego Suite," 2006). 
 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH 
The question of concern is whether steganography is being used by criminals? 
The research targets the population of steganography users with a criminal 
background (represented by the shaded area in figure 1). The usage of 
steganography may or may not be made for committing or providing assistance 
to crime. As shown in figure 2, the research consisted of two projects. The first 
project consisted of the detection of the presence of steganography in carrier 
images found on the Web and the second project consisted of detecting if 
steganographic applications had been installed (and/or used) and whether they 
left behind file artifacts on computers that were seized during criminal 
investigations of various types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Target population of the Research 
Criminals 
Users of Steganography 
Steganography 
used for criminal 
purposes 
Research Question: 
Is steganography being 
used by criminals (and to 
what extent)?  
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Figure 2: Overview of the Research 
 
2.1. Research Project I: Signature Detection in Carrier Images  
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been used by criminals to communicate information over the Web. This project 
made the use of the signature (image artifact) detection technique explained in 
Section 1. 
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2.1.1. Motivation  
Digital steganography represents a particularly significant threat today because 
of the large number of applications freely available on the Internet that are easy 
to find, download, install, and use to steal sensitive, classified, or proprietary 
information and conceal evidence of other types of criminal activity (Backbone 
Security). On the Web, there is evidence of terrorists using steganography to 
communicate covertly. “…individuals can use steganography…to embed 
messages into digital photographs or music clips. Posted on publicly available 
Web sites, the photos or clips are downloaded by collaborators as necessary. 
(This technique was reportedly used by recently arrested terrorists when they 
planned to blow up the US Embassy in Paris)” (Homer-Dixon, 2002, p. 54; 
Kolata, 2001). Terrorists would want to hide information in images which are 
posted to high traffic sites which have high turnover rates of images (Davidson 
and Goutam, 2004). Thus, steganography has the potential for harmful and 
dangerous applications. 
2.1.2. Steganographic Web Survey 
An attempt to determine the prevalence of steganography in carrier images on 
the Web was made by the research team in conjunction with Backbone 
Security, Inc. and law enforcement.  
2.1.3. Comparison with related Prior Work: Survey conducted by 
University of Michigan  
The research project described in this paper is distinct from the Web survey 
conducted by Neils Provos of University of Michigan in 2001. The latter used 
the tool Stegdetect to analyze over two million images from downloaded only 
from eBay auction sites. It was a survey of JPEG images only. The University 
of Michigan concluded that there was no steganography on the Web (Provos 
and Honeyman, 2002). Provos’ survey used signature-based detection tools to 
detect the possible embedding of steganography only by three possible tools 
while as this research addresses as many as 16 information hiding tools. 
2.1.4. Tools and Validation 
The signature-based detection software selected for the survey proposed in this 
paper was StegAlyzerSS, version 1.1, named StegScan 1.1. The version of the 
software used to test the suspect images was ported to ANSI C from the 
proprietary version, and run under Debian LINUX. The version 2.0 of this 
software was rated effective by the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI) in 
tests conducted during October 2006. The tests conducted by the DCCI 
indicated the Backbone software was able to identify steganography from 
fourteen different algorithms with 99.6% certainty that steganography existed 
when an image was detected as containing steganography (Hirsh and Kong, 
2006). The Backbone StegAlyzerSS was able to identify steganography 
embedded by the applications listed in table 1 (CyberScience Laboratory 
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Functional Analysis of StegAlyzerSS Version 1.1, 2005).  
Table 1: List of Detectable Signatures 
Steganography Embedding Program 
CryptArkan 1.0 InPlain View 1.0 wbStego 4.2 wbStego 2.0 
JPegX 1.00.6 Camouflage 1.0.4 Camouflage 1.1.2 Camouflage 1.2.1 
Cloak 7.0 Data Stash 1.1 Data Stash 1.1b Data Stealth 1.0 
Hiderman Safe and Quick 2002 Steganography 1.50 Steganography 1.61 
 
2.1.5. Added Software Functionality 
While the StegalyzerSS product was used as the processing engine to analyze 
the Web-based images, that engine needed to be embedded within a larger 
system capable of crawling the Web in search of those images. The following 
additional functionality was developed:  
? Added capability to run on multiple processing nodes that then 
aggregated their findings onto a single master node.  
? Utilized MD5 hashing to prevent the downloading and analysis of 
duplicate pages (i.e. the same image file on multiple pages)  
? Utilized concept of worksets where a workset is a single URL to be 
used as a starting point for crawling. All crawling was limited to the 
Internet domain that the initial URL belongs to.  
? Recorded all downloaded files for option of re-analysis later with 
additional signatures.  
2.1.6. Equipment 
Web crawling technology was used to find and download images by the 
research team.  The survey was conducted with a variable number of machines 
as seen in the table 2. One database server was always on line. This database 
server was the supervisor, and passed each next URL to the crawling nodes 
(machines which performed the HTTP requests).  
 
Table 2: Crawling Node Force Deployment 
Date  Crawling Nodes  
3/31/2007  2  
4/24/2007  3  
6/19/2007  5  
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The database and file server computer was a Dell Optiplex GX280 Pentium 4 
at 2.8GHz with 1 GB of RAM. The crawling nodes were Pentium IIIs running 
at 667 MHz with 512MB RAM. The connection to the Internet was made 
through a fiber optic connection. The overall system layout of the survey is 
illustrated in figure 3. 
  
 
Figure 3: Web Crawler System Diagram    
  
2.1.7. Data Gathering and Analysis 
The survey was conducted by crawling selected base URLs recursively until 
there were no more links in the domain of the base URL to visit. Sites that had 
URLs different than specified base URLs were not visited. The base URLs of 
the sites that were surveyed were provided by parties interested in the results of 
the research as it pertained to their areas of responsibility. These organizations 
included the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) and the Indiana 
State Police. Heavily trafficked foreign sites figured prominently in the list of 
sites crawled for steganography. The total also included sites which had less 
than ten URLs searched. As seen in table 3, the number in parentheses 
indicates the number of base URLs in the grouping. The total is the total for all 
of the sites crawled with that grouping of completed URLs.  
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Table 3: Number of Completed URLs 
Base URL Groupings Completed URLs 
A (4) - 10-100 URLs 205 
B (6) - 101-1,000 URLs 2,912 
C (2) - 1,001-10,000URLs 5,599 
D (4) - 10,001 - 100,000 URLs 189,014 
E (3) - 100,001 + 1,221,380 
Total (sites with < 10 completed URLs) 1,419,114 
 
The crawler application started at the base URL and crawled through all the 
links from each page to the maximum possible depth from the base URL. All 
of the items which were contained in a HREF= or IMG SRC= tag in the page 
source were downloaded, cataloged and then analyzed. The base URL was 
never traveled away from in the search, i.e., when a link specified a site with a 
different base URL, that link was not followed. The first recorded result was 
time-stamped 03/31/2006 at 1552hrs (local, Eastern time) and the final result 
was recorded on 06/30/2006 at 0444hrs.The image file types discovered in the 
survey are summarized in table 4.  
Table 4: Image File Types Discovered in Survey File 
Extension Number Found 
BMP 9 
GIF 8,544 
JPG 67,414 
PNG 64 
TIFF 7 
X-3DS 7 
 
These images were gathered and analyzed with the help of StegAlyzerSS 
application. No carrier images were found to contain steganographic 
signatures. Thus, the project failed to answer the research questions presented 
in figure 1 and figure 2.  
 
2.1.8. Intermediate Conclusion 
The Web crawling survey and signature detection did not find any conclusive 
evidence that steganography is being used on the Web. There are several 
possible explanations for this:  
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? There is no steganography in images on the Web 
? The sample size was too small  
? There was steganography, however it was not hidden in the file 
formats that the detection software was able to detect against, or  
? There was steganography in the surveyed images; however it was not 
hidden using the algorithms the detection software was aware of.  
 
2.1.9. Research Redirection 
The detection problem in steganography is multivariate. There are over 825 
embedding applications which have been available for download from the 
Internet at various times (J. Goldman, personal communication, May 16, 
2007). This number is to be compared to the number of signatures which image 
analysis software is currently capable of detecting, which is in the 
neighborhood of 25-35. Not all of these signatures can be detected by a single 
steganography detection application.  
The most likely explanation for the steganography not being detected in the 
Research Project I is that the steganography used and posted on the public 
Internet uses hiding techniques and hiding applications which were not being 
tested by the StegAlyzerSS detection application.  
There are many steganography-producing applications that could possibly be 
used and it is impractical to write signature detection algorithms for all of 
them. For this reason, some prioritization of effort in developing signature 
based detection methods must be achieved. To do so there must be a sense of 
which applications the users of steganography are employing. To study this 
concept, the following “Stego-Usage Timeline” (table 5) was formed.  
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Figure 4: The Stego-Usage Timeline 
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stegoed file is transmitted or posted, it could be observed over the 
communications channel. It would also be theoretically possible to run 
detection techniques against all of the data observed during transmission.  
Once the suspect files have been detected, further analysis is performed. 
Knowing the specific steganography- producing application which hid the 
information would allow for possible extraction. If the message is extracted, 
then there may be a decryption step if the information was encrypted before it 
was embedded and sent. The user of the steganography software would then 
potentially uninstall the software perhaps thinking naively that no trace of his 
or her activity existed. In fact, because the vast majority of these applications 
are written with less than professional production values, the artifacts of the 
existence of that software would still be present on the host system and would 
be detectable if proper detection methods were used. Artifact detection would 
be the final step. This step requires the forensic examiner to have access to the 
host machine and is able to analyze it with the proper software.  
Thus, a research redirection from Project I to Project II was introduced in order 
to address the research question as shown in figure 5. The research was carried 
out in two subsequent phases where Project II followed Project I and in which 
the approach taken for addressing the research question was modified based on 
the conclusions presented in 2.1.8 and the fact that the Project I failed to 
establish that steganography was used by criminals. Thus, Research Project I 
provides context for Research Project II. The redirection was based on the 
concept of ‘Stego-Usage Timeline’ presented in figure 4. As explained above, 
steganography-generation process involves many phases and while the time 
when the signature-based method (as demonstrated in Research Project I) can 
be used for detection is later in the timeline, the host-file detection method 
(demonstrated in Research Project II) allows us to traverse back to the earlier 
stages of steganography-generation and its detection is applicable over a larger 
span (dotted line in figure 4 marks the end of this span) of the Stego-Usage 
timeline as compared to that of the former. 
Thus, the redirection consists of a focus shift from the analysis of the ‘product’ 
of the steganography-producing software; viz. the images, to the ‘evidence’ left 
by the steganography-producing software while they are being used to generate 
steganographic images.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Research Redirection 
 
Is steganography being used by criminals (and to what extent)? 
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Research 
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2.2. Research Project II: File Artifact Detection on Criminal Computers 
The second phase of the research consisted of scanning computers seized by 
law enforcement agencies for steganographic file artifacts.  
2.2.1. Motivation 
A tool which can detect steganographic file artifacts can be used on suspects’ 
machines to determine if certain steganography-producing software was ever 
present or used and what it may have been. With positive results regarding the 
use of steganography software on machines seized by law enforcement or the 
national security apparatus, a sense of which steganography-producing 
software is popular with which criminal elements can be gained, thereby 
allowing research in signature detection to be focused in that direction. 
It would be useful to require that all imaged hard drives booked into evidence 
and examined should be examined for host system artifacts with a file artifact 
detection application. It is critical for efficient use of law enforcement and 
national security resources to know which applications are being used by 
criminal and terrorist suspects. With the knowledge of which steganography-
producing software is in use, based on evidence provided from seized 
computers which exhibit artifacts of that particular steganography software, 
there will be a more structured focus possible in terms of writing signature 
based detection tools. These tools would detect against the signatures of 
steganography-producing applications found to be favored by the groups which 
are of interest. Thus, a research focus shift to host system artifact detection was 
indicated by the Stego-Usage Timeline.  
2.2.2. Tools and Validation 
The product used for performing detection of the steganographic file artifacts 
was Backbone Security’s StegAlyzerAS version 2.1. This software tool enables 
the investigators to detect the presence of steganography-producing programs 
as well as the remnants of such programs within a computer’s file and registry. 
The program enables the user to search files, directories, entire drives, and 
forensic images to locate evidence of data hiding activity on a disk. The 
program is capable of mounting forensic images in the following formats: 
EnCase RAW (dd), ISO, and SMART. StegAlyzerAS includes case 
management features to log all actions performed during an investigation, 
record detailed information about each case, and manage collected evidence. 
The application generates reports in HTML format (CyberScience Laboratory, 
2008). Version 2.1 of StegAlyzerAS can detect all the file and Windows 
Registry artifacts associated with 625 digital steganography and information 
hiding tools (Backbone Security). StegAlyzerAS allows the search of the files 
by using hash values such as MD5 and SHA-256 which are stored in the 
Steganography Application Fingerprint Database (SAFDB) and registry entries 
stored in the Registry Artifact Key Database (RAKDB) distributed with 
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StegAlyzerAS (Backbone Security).  
This host artifact detection tool was tested for performance by conducting a 
study of a test machine on which a variety of steganographic software was 
installed and deleted or uninstalled. StegAlyzerAS was able to detect that all of 
those steganography-producing programs were once installed on the test 
machine. Also, StegAlyzerAS was found to be effective for identifying file and 
registry artifacts by the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI) and the 
CyberScience Laboratory (CSL) (Backbone Security). 
 
2.2.3. Data Collection Process 
The product along with its usage instructions was sent to Chicago Police 
Department (CPD) which scanned the criminal computer disks with the help of 
StegAlyzerAS.  A member of the research team was allowed to carry out the 
scans of the criminal computers for a day at the CPD. The research team also 
scanned images provided by the Indiana State Police. The tool was run against 
the disk images of total 96 computer drives from seized computers and each 
one was known as a case. This formed the sample set which corresponded to 
the population of users of steganography with criminal background (n=96). 
2.2.4. Data Processing and Analysis 
The information from the generated HTML files was extracted into a MS 
Access database (2002- 2003 format) which consisted the following for each 
case: 
? Description of the case: This consisted of details regarding the seized 
computer, crime associated with it, agency handling the case and 
criminal details 
? Results obtained after scanning the respective drive: This consisted of 
information about the artifacts found in the report of each case, the 
corresponding steganography-producing application which generated 
it, the location of the artifact and its MD5 hash value. 
2.2.5. False Positive Analysis 
A large number of artifacts were flagged as likely steganography-producing 
software artifacts. But these artifacts may or may not have been the indicators 
that steganographic tools were installed on that machine because certain 
artifacts that are left behind by the steganography-producing applications can 
also be left by common and harmless applications; e.g. unwise.exe is a 
common artifact found bundled with the Wise installer package. Although, 
StegalyzerAS flags it to be associated with steganography-producing software, 
a particular instance of the artifact may be left behind by software like MS 
Word since unwise.exe is used by non-steganographic software too. Therefore, 
the entire artifact list obtained in the scan results had to be subjected to a false 
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positive analysis.  
In order to ensure that a particular artifact was specific to a steganographic 
application the following false positive treatment was devised. The NIST 
National Software Reference Library database (NSRL) consists of MD5 hash 
values of file artifacts left by known, traceable software applications and it also 
lists the type of application it is. The NIST database was broken down into 3 
different classes as follows: 
 
Table 5: NIST Database Artifact Classification 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Consisted of MD5 hash 
values of artifacts 
which belonged only to 
the non-steganographic 
applications   
 
Consisted of MD5 hash 
values of artifacts 
which belonged only to 
the steganographic 
applications 
Consisted of MD5 hash 
values of artifacts which 
were common to both 
the steganographic as 
well as the non-
steganographic 
applications. 
 
The false positive analysis was carried out by assigning a value to each 
(artifact, corresponding steganography-producing application) pair based on 
the comparison of its hash value with those in the NSRL database and 
depending on the class under which it fell. The values were assigned from the 
following set:  
 
Table 6: Results Artifact Classification 
NS PS ID NF MS 
Not Steganography, 
if the artifact  was 
found in the Class 1 
Positive 
Steganography, 
if it was found 
only in Class 2 
 
Indeterminate, 
if it was found 
in Class 3 
Not Found, if it was 
not found in either of 
the classes of table 5, 
so it is not known 
whether the artifact is 
steganographic or 
not. 
Manual Scan: The 
pairs flagged with 
the value NF were 
checked manually 
for their location 
where the artifacts 
were found and 
depending on 
intelligent human 
judgment, they 
were flagged as 
MS if the path or 
pathnames showed 
any indication of 
the artifact being 
in steganography 
related folders. 
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2.2.6. Results and Analysis 
The artifacts and applications were then subjected to analysis as per the value 
taken by the false positive flag. The obtained results and their implications are 
enlisted as below: 
? The term ‘interesting items’ refers to the entries flagged with a ‘PS’ or 
a ‘NF’ value because it indicates that either the (application, artifact) 
pair is confirmed as steganography or it cannot be eliminated as a non-
steganographic instance respectively. 
? The total of the 96 cases had 4708 (application, artifact) pairs and not 
all of them were unique. In terms of artifacts, only 62 unique artifact 
names were found where 11 of them appeared only once.  The 
remaining 51 artifact names accounted for 928 of the 939 total 
interesting items (98.8%). Thus, a large number of duplicates was 
found in the (application, artifact) pairs.  
? Manual scan results depended on the intelligent judgment of the 
human who was conducting it. As seen in table 7, in spite of going 
through the paths of each and every (application, artifact) pair, it was 
not possible to conclude in any case that an artifact was definitively 
steganographic in nature from its path name and the location of the 
folder on the seized criminal computer. Thus, the manual scan failed 
to produce any positive results for this dataset (MS=0).  
The number of occurrences for each of the flag values in the order of its 
decreasing importance is specified in table 7. 
 
Table 7: Analysis of flag occurrence counts 
Serial 
Number 
Flag Occurrence  
(Total 4708) 
Percentage of 
Occurrence 
(rounded) 
(%) 
1 PS (Interesting 
Items) 
12 0.2549 
2 MS 0 0.0000 
3 NF(Interesting 
Items) 
927 19.6899 
4 ID 1785 37.9142 
5 NS 1984 42.1410 
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? It can be observed that there is 42.1410 % of confirmed non-
steganographic data which means that in  the best possible case there 
can be 57.8590% of steganography (if all the NF and ID flags were 
indeed positive in terms of steganography) out of which this research 
was able to prove and confirm 0.2549%. The other tools that 
StegAlyzerSS was capable of detecting were either not popular among 
the criminals or their corresponding artifacts were categorized as NF 
or ID. And thus the possibility of the usage of those applications by 
criminals cannot be eliminated.  
? Twelve Positive Steganography flags were found. They were 
distributed over four cases respectively. Table 8 provides the details 
regarding these findings. It can be seen that the results generated by 
StegAlyzerAS and the false positive treatment confirmed the use of 
four different applications for generating steganography; viz. Gif-It-
Up, OutGuess, MP3StegoEncoder and wbStego. If these applications 
are compared with those mentioned in table 1 it is observed that the 
signature detection tool StegAlyzerSS was only capable of scanning 
the criminal computers for 16 programs and out of which only one; 
namely wbStego was used by the criminals and also the version used 
was different. Thus table 8 demonstrates that steganography had been 
used by criminals of varied backgrounds and that certain 
steganographic tools are likely to be popular among criminals that the 
signature detection tools were not capable of recognizing.  
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Table 8: Positive Steganography Flag details 
Case 
Number 
Number 
of PS 
Flags  
Crime 
Type 
Application Name Artifact Name 
1 8 Attempted 
Homicide 
wbStego99 v3.51  _ISREG32.DLL 
wbStego99 v3.5 _ISREG32.DLL 
wbStego99 v3.1 _ISREG32.DLL 
wbStego v4.2 _ISREG32.DLL 
wbStego v4.0 _ISREG32.DLL
* 
MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15 
(Linux) 
Huffdec 
MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15 
(Linux) 
Dewindow 
wbStego v4.1 _ISREG32.DLL 
2 2 Fraud on a 
Financial 
Institution 
MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15 
(Linux) 
Dewindow 
MP3StegoEncoder v1.1.15 
(Linux) 
Huffdec 
3 1 Unknown OutGuess v0.2 (Linux) install-sh 
4 1 Child Porn Gif-It-Up v1.0 _ISREG32.DLL
* 
*Although the commonality of the artifact is observed over different steganography-
producing applications, the aim of the flag classification is indicating the presence of 
positive steganography and not establishing a unique correlation between an artifact 
and an application 
? These results can also contribute in formulating efficient signature 
detection approach by providing input in the form of a list of popular 
steganography-producing programs. This is done by introducing 
prioritization in the process of signature detection as shown in figure 
6. As explained in section 2.1.9, the detection software faces 
limitations in terms of the number of signatures it is capable of 
detecting. This is because the number of existing steganography-
producing applications is too large to be incorporated into the 
detection engine and it keeps growing over time. For instance, from 
the feedback of the analysis provided by table 8, the detection tool 
should incorporate the capability for detecting the steganography-
producing tools found in file artifact scanning; namely Gif-It-Up, 
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OutGuess, MP3StegoEncoder and the specific versions of wbStego 
mentioned in the table 8, i.e. it should be aware of the algorithms used 
by these applications. The applications which are associated with NF 
and ID flags and which occur over and over again can also be 
incorporated in the signature detection tool. Since a large number of 
(artifact, application) duplicate pairs were found in this case, it 
becomes easier to choose the applications for prioritization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The Concept of Prioritized Feedback 
2.3. Conclusion 
 The results of the Research Project II demonstrate that evidence pertaining to 
the usage of steganography by criminals was found and thus a proof of concept 
of the effectiveness of the new, enhanced procedure proposed for finding 
steganography was presented. The procedure proposed in Research Project I 
failed to provide evidence in favor of the argument that ‘steganography is 
being used by criminals’. Thus, the new methodology based on Stego-Usage 
Timeline is an improvement over the one proposed in Research Project I and 
has been able to answer the research questions presented in figure 1 and figure 
2 positively. The research also demonstrates the concept of prioritization of the 
steganography-producing software by providing feedback based on the 
scanning results for the purpose of designing efficient signature detection 
algorithms. The following figure summarizes the contribution of the entire 
research effort. 
Signature 
Detection Software 
Research 
Project II 
Research 
Project I 
Producers of Signature 
Detection Software 
Uses 
Produce 
Provides feedback of most commonly installed 
steganography-producing software 
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Figure 7: Key Outcomes of Research Projects 
2.4. Further Research 
Although the research was able to present a proof of concept of the 
proposed Stego-Usage Timeline methodology, the evidence observed 
was limited and is not statistically significant to analyze the trends the 
observed in steganography-producing applications and criminal 
backgrounds associated with it. This can be due to several possible 
reasons:  
? The sample size (number of cases scanned=96) was too small  
? Criminals used steganography; however the file artifacts could not be 
traced down as being steganographic in nature when they were 
common to many applications (i.e. they fell under NF and ID 
categories) 
? Criminals used steganography; however the file artifact detection 
software was unaware of the applications used by the criminals to 
generate steganography and hence was unable to associate the 
corresponding artifacts to steganography  
Thus, further research is being focused towards obtaining more positives 
by increasing the sample set in order to overcome the first limitation 
mentioned above.  The proof of concept has demonstrated that 
steganography is being used but further research will help in answering 
the question ‘to what extent steganography is being used’. 
Also, a model of a multi-phased approach towards steganography 
detection is being formulated where the usage of both techniques; viz. 
artifact detection and signature detection is suggested for the detection 
of steganography. A more prioritized and focused direction which deals 
Key Outcomes of Research Project I  
• Over 1 million Web sites crawled for images 
• Images scanned for steganographic signatures and no steganography found 
• Concepts of Stego-Usage Timeline and Prioritization proposed 
• Research methodology redefined based on Stego-Usage Timeline with a focus on file 
Key Outcomes of Research Project II 
• Over 96 crime-related seized drives scanned for steganographic artifacts 
• False positive analysis carried out with help of the NSRL database 
• Proof of Concept demonstrated for the host file artifact-based detection methodology 
• Concept of Prioritization demonstrated
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with the artifact detection first and then proceeds to the signature 
detection with algorithms incorporating the prioritization feedback is 
proposed. This approach has the potential to be an efficient mechanism 
in terms of time and effort by overcoming the limitations faced by either 
of the research projects when carried out independently.  
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